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Executive Summary 
Charter schools are the most rapidly growing form of school choice in the 
United States.  Since Georgia enacted its charter school law in 1993, approximately 
70 charter schools have been authorized throughout the state.  Legislation passed in 
recent years has authorized the creation of entire districts of charter schools, which is 
expected to increase their numbers to over 100 by the 2009-10 school year.   
Charter schools are public schools that have governance and management 
autonomy from local school districts and the State Board of Education.  In exchange 
for this independence, charter schools must meet performance objectives conditioned 
in their charters.  If performance objectives are not met, charter schools can have their 
contracts revoked at the end of the charter period (typically five years).  Despite the 
growing popularity of charter schools as an educational alternative to traditional 
public schools, relatively little is known about their financial positions or 
management practices compared to student performance objectives that are typically 
the focus of accountability for charter schools.  What evidence exists suggests that 
they face significant fiscal constraints and challenges. 
This report sheds light on the financial health of start-up charter schools in 
Georgia during the 2006-07 school year.  Financial health, for this report, is defined 
as the short-term ability to meet recurring expenses with recurring revenues.  A 
charter school in good financial condition generally maintains an adequate service 
level during fiscal downturns, forecasts and adjusts well to enrollment changes, and 
develops resources to expand to full capacity and meet future needs.  A charter school 
in fiscal stress usually struggles to balance its budget, suffers service declines when 
enrollment decreases, has a difficult time adjusting to state or local funding 
fluctuations, and has limited resources to expand or meet future needs. 
Financial indicators computed for this paper are measures of liquidity, fund 
balance, step/fixed costs, and budget flexibility.  Liquidity measures indicate how 
well a school can meet its current liabilities with cash and cash-like resources on 
hand.  Step and fixed costs constrain schools from offering optimal instructional 
services when the importance of such costs cannot be minimized by spreading them 
across many students.  Measures of fund balance include a school’s year-to-year 
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operating surplus or deficit and its cumulative reserve of resources across multiple 
years.  Finally, budget flexibility is measured by a school’s reliance on federal, state, 
or local funding, which if too high, will cause financial stress in economic downturns. 
This report also compares financial data from 2006-07 with descriptive 
statistics from a multi-year analysis of charter schools to see if financial indicators 
over time are consistent with the one year cross-section.  This paper is an interim 
report of a larger study examining the fiscal health and financial management 
practices of Georgia’s small, but growing charter school population.  Besides 
providing basic financial information on the state’s start-up charter schools, this 
report explores the role played by factors such as school type, age, and size in 
financial condition.  It concludes with recommendations for programs and policy 
changes, which may improve the financial health and stability of charter schools in 
Georgia.   
 
Findings 
● The financial health of Georgia’s start-up charter schools in the 2006-07 
school year is mixed.  Although a majority of start-up schools had a positive 
financial position, over 40 percent of schools (11 out of 25) ran an operating 
deficit or reported negative net assets at the end of their fiscal years.  One of 
these schools closed at the end of the school year.  Although eight of the 
schools running operating deficits had positive net assets to sustain them to 
the next school year, only two had large enough reserves of cash to meet 
current liabilities at levels recommended to provide an adequate cash reserve 
if expenses run higher than expected.  Three schools had negative net assets, 
all of which were in their first two years of operating.  It is not unusual for 
new start-up schools to be in debt as they grow and age, but these schools are 
struggling to meet expenditure commitments even with access to 
implementation grants.  Two of these schools are in debt to their education 
management organization for start-up loans and burdensome facilities costs. 
● School age is a key factor in financial condition.  Having enough cash on 
hand to meet current obligations is difficult for schools operating in their first 
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three years, as evidenced by their low liquidity ratios relative to schools 
making it past the first charter re-authorization period (year 6 and beyond).  
New start-ups rely on private foundation and federal grants to survive through 
the early years of operation as they grow their enrollments.  Although public 
and private implementation grants keep many young schools in the black, 
they also contribute to a great deal of variability in measures of fund balance 
for these schools.  Schools that survive to year four and beyond may have 
lower operating surpluses as a share of expenditures, but they often manage to 
accumulate a consistent (and arguably more predictable) fund balance 
regardless of enrollment level.  This may indicate that as charter school board 
members and managers become more experienced they are able to develop 
budgeting and financial management practices more appropriate to their 
school’s operating environment.   
● School size is positively related to charter school financial health, but it is 
unclear if larger enrollments by themselves help improve a school’s financial 
position or if larger enrollments only improve financial health for more 
established charter schools.  School age is correlated with school size for 
Georgia’s start-up charters (0.46).  As “experiments” in public education for 
curriculum and governance, it has been considered good practice to slowly 
grow enrollment over the first several years of operation so that curriculum 
methodology and management structure can develop.  For short-term 
financial condition, however, low enrollments can put schools at risk of 
closure because they have less per-pupil revenue to spread over their 
step/fixed costs.  It is difficult to discern if low liquidity and fund balance 
measures for small schools is a function of size or age or the combination of 
both.  Clearly for some costs like facilities, the number of students in a school 
is important.  Local authorizers who partner with charter schools might 
consider increasing funding beyond federal implementation grants to aid 
charter schools’ start-up through the first charter renewal term if enrollments 
are expected to be small.  Another option might be to encourage charters to 
start with more students or ramp up their enrollments more quickly to 
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improve financial stability.  More research is needed on the interrelationship 
between school size and age in charter school financial health. 
● As small, independent organizations, charter schools have few opportunities 
to realize economies of size.  Start-up charter schools are responsible for 
managing and staffing non-instructional services on its own.  These services 
range from marketing to payroll to food services.  About $1 of every $8 in 
expenditures for a charter school goes towards management and 
administration costs alone (food services and facilities excluded).  
Management and administration expenses typically include salaries of school 
business staff who manage a school’s books, manage student and teacher 
records (vital for ensuring correct funding from the state), recruit students and 
teachers, manage information technology services, etc.  Charter schools that 
do not provide these services themselves must contract out for them or find 
qualified volunteers to do the work.  Traditional public schools have a central 
administrative office to provide these services for many schools.  An 
alternative to providing additional state funding to charter schools to pay for 
these services on their own is to help them reduce costs through shared 
services.  For example, it may be beneficial to charter schools to buy business 
services from their authorizing districts as an alternative to using private 
contractors or an educational management organization.  Since local 
authorizers already have the systems in place to provide these services, it is 
likely to be a relatively low additional cost to the district to add charter 
schools.  Other services such as transportation and food service are already 
offered to charters in some districts, so it seems plausible to add-on services 
like student data management, payroll, and plant maintenance.   
In cases where charter schools would prefer to maintain their 
independence or their local districts are not willing to extend services to 
charter schools, then cooperative service agreements among charter schools 
may be an option for reducing costs.  Since 75 percent of start-up charter 
schools are located within the Atlanta metropolitan region, it seems 
worthwhile to share business services and pool equipment and supplies 
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purchases to reduce unit costs for each school.  The Knowledge is Power 
Program (KIPP) schools in the Atlanta metropolitan region share many of 
these functions, in addition to development services, social workers, and high 
school placement coordinators.  A similar cooperative for non-KIPP schools 
could help to reduce the inefficiencies associated with small schools 
procuring the same goods and services independently.  Likewise, when 
schools are sharing services they are sharing knowledge about best practices.  
Although it is a challenge to coordinate cooperatives, the cost benefits could 
be substantial.   
● There is no official guidance or rule for start-up charter schools on which 
accounting guidelines or presentation to use in preparing their financial 
statements, nor a required deadline for submitting them to the Georgia 
Department of Education (GDOE).  A majority of schools use the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) guidelines, but nearly half either report 
entirely using the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
guidelines or use both.  Accounting guidelines have implications for how 
schools account for expenses and revenues and whether their local districts 
treat them as component units.  No uniform practice of reporting financial 
information makes comparison of charter school finances challenging and 
closes the door on developing a meaningful financial indicator system to 
detect financial stress early in a school’s operation.  Likewise, lack of a 
statutory requirement for when audited financial statements are due to local 
authorizers and GDOE effectively nullifies any attempt to monitor financial 
health of charter schools.  Current law requires start-up charter schools to 
submit an annual report to GDOE by October 1, which may include audited 
or unaudited financial statements.  A third of schools did not have their 
financial audits complete by this date for the 2006-07 school year; thus, they 
answered financial questions in the annual report without having their 
financial position verified by an independent auditor.  An examination of the 
information provided by these schools in the 2006-07 Annual Report to the 
State Board of Education published by the Charter Schools Division (CSD) of 
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GDOE reveals that all but two of these schools incorrectly reported their 
financial positions to the State in their annual reports.  Since this document is 
the only interim fiscal monitoring tool of charter schools outside of the 
charter renewal review, it is important that schools complete their 
independent audits in a timely fashion.  Audited financial statements for all 
start-up charter schools should be based on the same accounting guidelines 
(FASB vs. GASB), and charter schools should face the same required 
deadline for submission to GDOE.  To enforce timely submission of audited 
financial statements under official rule or law, CSD could withhold federal 
implementation grants or state facilities funds or, at a minimum, post a list of 
schools not meeting the October 1 deadline since failure to complete audits 
on time itself is an indicator of poor financial management within a school. 
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I.  Introduction 
Charter schools are the most rapidly growing form of school choice in the 
United States, expanding from 100 schools in 1995 to over 4,100 schools in 2007 
(NCES, 2007).  Since Georgia enacted its charter school law in 1993, approximately 
70 charter schools have been authorized throughout the state.  Legislation passed in 
recent years has authorized the creation of entire districts of charter schools, which is 
expected to increase their numbers to over 100 by the 2009-10 school year.   
Despite the growing popularity of charter schools as an educational 
alternative to traditional public schools, relatively little is known about their financial 
positions or management practices.  What evidence exists suggests that they face 
significant fiscal constraints and challenges.  Besides anecdotal evidence on charter 
school failure (Labbe, 2006; Gootman, 2006; Jacksonville Business Journal, 2004), 
there are several reviews of charter school financial management which indicate that 
a non-trivial number of charter schools have been in a precarious financial position, 
particularly in their formative years.  For example, the Office of Legislative Auditor 
for the State of Minnesota (2003) found that “about one-fourth of charter schools 
open in fiscal year 2002 had financial problems, as indicated by negative fund 
balance or deficit spending…” (p.1).  A study of charter school financial management 
in Florida (Office of the Florida Legislature, 2000) found that close to 30 percent had 
negative fund balances.  Moody’s credit ratings of charter schools are well below 
those for traditional public schools and more than one-third were below investment 
grade (Moody’s, 2003).  In Georgia, four of eight failed, start-up charter schools had 
serious financial difficulties before closing or having their charters revoked (GDAA, 
2009). 
This report sheds light on the financial health of start-up charter schools in 
Georgia during the 2006-07 school year.  It also compares this one-year of financial 
data with descriptive statistics from a school-year panel to see if financial indicators 
over time are consistent with the one year cross-section.  This paper is an interim 
report of a larger study examining the fiscal health and financial management 
 
An Examination of the Financial Health of 
Georgia's Start-Up Charter Schools 
 
 
2 
practices of Georgia’s small, but growing charter school population.1 Besides 
providing basic financial information on the state’s start-up charter schools, this 
report explores the role played by factors such as school type, age, and size in 
financial condition.  It concludes with recommendations for programs and policy 
changes, which may improve the financial health and stability of charter schools in 
Georgia.  To the extent that the charter school movement is expanding in Georgia and 
across the United States, this research provides important lessons for charter schools 
and authorizers about how to assess and improve their financial health. 
 
                                                 
1 Results presented here are cross-sectional for the 2006-07 school year.  For schools in operation 
prior to this year, financial statements were collected to assess trends in financial health over time.  
These results make up the school-year panel, which is compared to the 2006-07 cross-section at 
the end of the report.  A financial condition indicator system is under development to broaden the 
indicators of financial health beyond what can be constructed using financial statements.  These 
additional indicators include measures of market position, school governance and management, 
and school performance.  At this time, development of a financial condition indicator system is 
limited by lack of uniformity in data reporting required of start-up charter schools. 
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II.  Background 
 Charter schools are public schools that have governance and management 
autonomy from local school districts and the State Board of Education.  In exchange 
for this independence, charter schools must meet performance objectives conditioned 
in their charters.  If performance objectives are not met, charter schools can have their 
contracts revoked at the end of the charter period (typically five years).  Charter 
schools must accept any student in a grade they serve within their jurisdictions for 
which they have capacity; however, parents choose to send their children to charter 
schools rather their assigned traditional public school.2 
The State of Georgia passed legislation authorizing charter schools in 1993.  
At that time, only local school districts could create a charter school, converting an 
existing school to charter status.  The Georgia legislature amended the Charter School 
Act in 1998 to permit independent groups and organizations to petition a local school 
district or the State Board of Education to “start-up” a charter school in its 
jurisdiction.  These schools operate independently from the local district or the State 
Board of Education, as they have their own governing boards which set school 
policies and make management and finance decisions for the school.  In addition to 
conversion and start-up charter schools, the Georgia legislature authorized entire 
school districts to convert to charter status in 2007 and created a new State 
Commission to grant charters to independent organizations in 2008.  These laws and 
amendments effectively have created five classifications of charter schools in 
Georgia: 1) Conversion schools; 2) System-wide conversion schools; 3) Start-up 
schools created and authorized by a local school board; 4) Start-up schools created by 
an independent organization but authorized by a local school board; and 5) Start-up 
schools created by an independent organization but authorized by the State 
Commission.  All charter schools must have their charters approved by the State 
Board of Education, regardless of whether a local school board or the State 
Commission first authorizes the school. 
                                                 
2 Unlike traditional public schools, charter schools decide how many students they will serve in 
each grade each year as defined in their charters.  If the number of students who want to attend a 
charter school exceeds its designated capacity, a lottery is held prior to the start of the school year 
to determine which students can enroll. 
 
An Examination of the Financial Health of 
Georgia's Start-Up Charter Schools 
 
 
4 
As public schools, charters receive federal, state, and local funding via a pass-
through from the local district.  The state portion of charter school funding follows 
the Quality Basic Education (QBE) formula used to allocate state appropriations to 
traditional public schools.  The QBE formula allocates funding largely by the number 
of students enrolled in a school, the characteristics of those students (e.g., grade, 
special education needs), and the characteristics of teachers (e.g., experience and 
education).  The local and federal share of a charter school’s funding is determined 
by each local school board where the charter school is located, which by law should 
be “no less favorable” than funding for a traditional public schools in its district.  
Local funding for charter schools varies district-by-district based on the local tax base 
and millage rate for public schools.  Charters also can apply for several competitive 
grants to help offset initial start-up costs, including a state funded facilities grant and 
a federal implementation grant ranging from $200,000 to $600,000 for use over a 
two-year period.  Legislation passed in May 2009 requires local school boards to 
allow charter schools to use excess facilities free of charge, which may make 
facilities grants less competitive depending on how much surplus space is available in 
school districts across the state. 
This report examines the financial health of start-up charter schools only.  
Other classifications of charter schools cannot be examined, because they do not 
report financial information separately from their local districts.  As of the 2006-07 
school year, 34 independent “start-up” charter schools had opened, but one in five 
had closed (seven schools).  This rate of failure warrants an investigation into how 
Georgia’s start-up charters perform on indicators chosen to assess financial health 
and if those still in operation can benefit from early detection of fiscal stress.  
Although financial difficulties can be a symptom of other deficiencies in managing a 
charter school (e.g., poor student performance, inadequate student recruitment, poor 
governance), insufficient attention to a school’s financial condition can be a direct 
cause of school failure. 
 This report presents descriptive statistics from the 2006-07 school year and 
from a school-year panel of data that considers start-up charters over the years each 
was in existence to preliminarily explore if one-year trends persist when individual 
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schools’ financial statements are pooled for all of the years a school has been in 
operation.  Independent start-ups are of interest because most have fixed costs related 
to facilities, and they do not benefit from the administrative services of their 
authorizing districts for budgeting, payroll, procurement, and plant operation and 
maintenance.  Start-up charters make up nearly half of all charter schools in Georgia 
(49 percent) but educate less than one percent of all public school students in the state 
(0.5 percent).  Despite this small market share, start-up charters are expected to grow 
as the charter movement strengthens and as a result of Georgia amending its charter 
legislation in 2008 to permit a state commission in addition to local districts to 
authorize schools. 
 The start-up charter schools reviewed for this report share characteristics of 
charter schools across the nation, yet differ on some traits relative to Georgia’s public 
schools (Table 1).  Start-up charters schools in Georgia have fewer students on 
average (300) than traditional public schools (769), with nearly 70 percent having 
fewer than 300 students.  Georgia’s average enrollment is similar to the size of 
charter schools across the nation (271), which reflects the practice of charter schools 
starting small to add grades as the school grows and/or the choice to serve fewer 
students per grade or class as a component of curricular programs or school culture.  
Start-ups serve a higher percentage of minority students (71 percent) than Georgia’s 
traditional public (53 percent) schools and US charter schools (58 percent), reflecting 
the fact that over 75 percent of start-ups are located in the Atlanta metropolitan 
region.3  Although start-ups serve a higher share of minorities, they have a slightly 
lower proportion of students who qualify for free or reduced price lunch (47 percent) 
compared to Georgia’s traditional public schools (50 percent).  This is likely a result 
of Georgia having many rural school districts with high proportions of poor students.  
Start-up charter schools in Georgia predominantly serve elementary or K-8 grades 
(50 percent), followed by middle school grades (28 percent), and high school grades 
(20 percent).  Finally,   start-up  charters  in  Georgia  enroll  a  similar  proportion  of  
                                                 
3 In the 2006-07 school year, 25 start-up charter schools were located in the following counties 
and cities of the Atlanta metropolitan area: Atlanta (8), DeKalb County (6), Fulton County (5), 
Carroll County (1), Clayton County (1), Cobb County (1), Coweta County (1), Douglas County 
(1), and Marietta City (1). 
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TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF GEORGIA START-UP CHARTER SCHOOLS 
COMPARED TO US CHARTER SCHOOLS AND GEORGIA TRADITIONAL PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
US  
Charter Schools 
GA  
Start-Ups 
GA  
Public Schools 
School enrollment (average) 272 299 769 
% minority enrollment 58% 71% 53% 
% free/reduced lunch 44% 47% 50% 
% special education NA 12% 12% 
Sources: Georgia Department of Education, Governor's Office of Student 
Achievement, 2006-07 School Report Cards.  National Center for Education 
Statistics, Common Core of Data, 2006-07. 
 
 
special education students (12 percent) as traditional public schools (12 percent), 
although charter schools typically serve less severe disabilities or must contract out 
intensive services to their authorizing districts or a private provider.   
Student composition has implications for the financial stability of start-up 
charter schools.  Since student count is the basis for the primary source of state and 
local revenue for start-ups, small enrollments limit the ability to spread fixed costs 
over the student body and threaten the ability to balance year-to-year operating 
budgets when enrollment fluctuates.  Likewise, to the extent start-up charter schools 
serve higher proportions of high-need students in urban areas, it may require more 
resources to meet student performance targets (Duncombe and Yinger, 2005).  
Schools failing to meet performance goals risk losing students (jeopardizing their 
revenue stream) and ultimately having their charters revoked.  In fact, newspaper 
accounts reporting on the failure of seven Georgia start-up charter schools in the 
period up to 2007 cite financial difficulties as the primary or close secondary reason 
for non-renewal of four of these schools.  (Donsky, 2002; Donsky 2003; MacDonald 
2004; MacDonald, 2005; Duffy, 2007; Gutierrez, 2007). 
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III.  Methods 
This study draws on the literature for financial condition analysis of public 
and non-profit organizations to develop a framework for measuring the financial 
health of charter schools.  For example, Ammar et al. (2005) developed a financial 
condition indicator system (FCIS) for New York school districts, which categorized 
financial condition into short-run financial condition, long-run financial condition, 
economic condition, and student performance.  While FCIS is more extensive than 
practical for charter schools, with 50 different indicators, some of the indicators in 
this system are relevant to charter schools.  Moody’s (2003), in developing credit 
ratings for charter schools, considers a broad array of factors such as service area 
demographics and enrollment trends, financial management policies and planning, 
charter school renewal risk, and the quality of charter school oversight.  In a review 
of Florida charter schools, the Office of the Florida Legislature (2000) used six 
indicators to evaluate financial condition, including fund balances, revenue 
forecasting accuracy, balanced budgets, financial controls, and demand for school 
services.   
The framework employed for this analysis captures the key dimensions of 
financial health, but uses indicators that were practical to assemble and analyze 
without significant data requests from charter schools or their authorizers.  
“Practical,” at this time, refers to the availability of audited financial statements and 
the presentation of financial information contained in them.  Financial statements, at a 
minimum, contain an auditor’s opinion as to material weakness in an organization’s 
financial statements, a snapshot of an organization’s financial position at the end of 
its fiscal year (Balance Sheet), a summary of inflows and outflows to the organization 
over the fiscal year (Statement of Activities), a presentation of how cash was 
generated and used over the fiscal year (Cash Flow Statement), and notes that explain 
the significant financial accounting principles used to compile the statements.  Some 
may also include the results of an internal control audit and/or a management 
discussion and analysis section (under the Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board guidelines).  Although financial statements contain sufficient information to 
begin an assessment of financial condition, they are intended for an audience external 
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to the organization and aggregate data in broad functional categories.  Many of the 
indicators developed by Moody’s (2003), Ammar et al. (2005), and the Office of the 
Florida Legislature (2000) require data that cannot be collected from these broad 
functional categories or from a single year’s financial statement (e.g., revenue 
forecasting accuracy, demand for services, internal controls).  Given this constraint, 
the findings presented in this report are sufficient for starting to detect fiscal stress, 
but are inconclusive in determining overall financial health.  Trend data and 
information about each school’s financial management practices are a longer range 
goal of this study, which will require more uniform data reporting from charter 
schools and/or their authorizers. 
The indicators calculated for this paper are for short-run financial condition.  
The average age of these schools is about four years, and few have long-term 
liabilities such as mortgages or long-term notes.  Since a start-up’s charter with the 
state typically expires after five years (unless renewed), many schools have not 
invested heavily in buildings or long-term assets other than for equipment.  Since 
charter schools are often started to pilot innovative curriculum and governance 
models in public education, the focus of management in most schools is to survive 
through the first renewal period.  Thus, a short-term focus on financial position is 
both realistic and practical given the young age and immediate goals for these 
schools. 
Financial condition is defined as “the ability of a [school] to balance recurring 
expenditure needs with recurring revenue sources, while providing [educational] 
services on a continuing basis.” (Office of the New York State Comptroller, 2008).  
A charter school in good financial condition generally maintains an adequate service 
level during fiscal downturns, forecasts and adjusts well to enrollment changes, and 
develops resources to expand to full capacity and meet future needs.  A charter school 
in fiscal stress usually struggles to balance its budget, suffers service declines when 
enrollment decreases, has a difficult time adjusting to state or local funding 
fluctuations, and has limited resources to expand or meet future needs. 
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Financial indicators computed for this paper are measures of liquidity, fund 
balance, step/fixed costs, and budget flexibility.4 Liquidity measures indicate how 
well a school can meet its current liabilities with cash and cash-like resources on 
hand.  Step and fixed costs constrain schools from offering optimal instructional 
services when the importance of such costs cannot be minimized by spreading them 
across many students.  Measures of fund balance include a school’s year-to-year 
operating surplus or deficit and its cumulative reserve of resources across multiple 
years.  Finally, budget flexibility is measured by a school’s reliance on federal, state, 
or local funding, which if too high, will cause financial stress in economic downturns. 
Specific indicators used in this analysis include measures computed using 
data collected from each school’s fiscal year 2007 audited financial statement: 
 
Liquidity 
● Current assets—a measure of current assets as a percentage of total assets.  
Schools with a low value for this indicator have few liquid assets on hand to 
meet future or unexpected liabilities.  Schools may report sizeable net assets 
but have little cash on hand, because their assets are tied up in property or 
equipment. 
● Current ratio—a measure of current assets to current liabilities.  This 
indicator measures a school’s ability to meet its current obligations. 
● Quick ratio—a measure of cash assets to current liabilities.  This is a more 
conservative indicator for a school’s ability to meet current obligations.  It 
only counts cash, marketable securities, and receivables as monies available 
to pay a school’s bills. 
 
Fund Balance 
● Net assets—a measure of net assets as a percentage of total expenditures.  
Schools with a moderate percentage of net assets relative to revenues have 
sufficient reserves for stable operations and potential growth. 
                                                 
4 Debt measures are not computed, because half of Georgia’s start-up charter schools are less than 
4 years old and do not have debt from mortgages or long-term notes.  As these schools age, debt 
measures will be a component of assessing financial health. 
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● Operating surplus/deficit—a measure of operating surplus/deficit as a 
percentage of total expenditures.  Negative values indicate a school did not 
balance its operating budget for the year. 
 
Step/Fixed Costs 
● Management expense—a measure of general and management expenditures 
as a percent of total expenditures.  Management costs are burdensome for 
small schools that cannot spread these expenses over many students.  A high 
percentage of management expenses will limit a school’s ability to meet 
instructional needs. 
● Facilities rent—a measure of annual rent as a percentage of total 
expenditures.  Since charter schools receive little (if any) funding for facilities 
from their local authorizers or the state, this indicator represents the degree to 
which schools must find alternative revenue sources or limit spending for 
other school needs. 
 
Flexibility 
● Government aid—a measure of federal, state, or local revenue as a percent of 
total revenues.  This percentage indicates a school’s reliance on public 
funding usually distributed on a per pupil basis and its potential instability if 
government aid decreases. 
 
As with any ratio analysis, what qualifies as “good” performance on an 
indicator is relative to the service sector and what is standard for that sector.  This 
analysis is exploratory for the charter school sector in that few studies have compiled 
financial indicators for charter schools.  Moody’s (2003) provides some guidance as 
to the performance on ratios for charters in other states, but its report focuses on long-
term debt and provides few specific data points for comparison with Georgia’s start-
up charter schools.  Georgia’s start-up charter schools have not been rated by 
Moody’s or other ratings agencies, because none have issued bonds or had bonds 
sponsored by a locality.  As predominantly small, young schools, their capital needs 
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are not large enough for these debt instruments and facilities are typically leased.  
Thus, comparisons on financial indicators that may be available through Moody’s are 
not applicable to Georgia’s start-up schools.  The financial indicators compiled in this 
report for Georgia’s charter schools will contribute to recent efforts in other states 
aiming to assess the financial health of charter schools across the country.5 
 
                                                 
5 To date, no systematic, national report on the financial health of charter schools has been 
completed, largely because charter school finance laws vary widely from state to state.  Existing 
reports are state-specific and few in number.  The Center on Educational Governance at the 
University of Southern California has compiled three indicators of financial health for charter 
schools reporting in the State of California’s Comprehensive Basic Education Data System since 
2003-04.  The Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education  has required 
its charter schools to submit standardized audited financial statements since 2005-06, but it does 
not calculate specific financial indicators from these statements.   
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IV.  Data 
The cross-sectional analyses in this report use audited financial statements 
from 25 Georgia start-up schools that were in operation in the 2006-07 school year.6 
More recent data from the 2007-08 school year were preferred for this analysis, but at 
the time of publication five schools required to prepare independent audit reports had 
not done so or had not submitted them to the Georgia Department of Education’s 
Charter School Division (CSD).7 Audited financial statements for 2006-07 were 
collected from CSD, with the exception of two which were requested via email 
directly from the school.  Data on school characteristics were compiled using the 
Georgia Department of Education School Report Cards for 2006-07.   
Data for the analyses of schools’ financial statements, pooled for all of the 
years each school has been in operation, come from audited financial statements and 
IRS 990 forms.8 Due to the uniformity in reporting definitions, IRS 990 forms were 
preferred as a data source if both audits and IRS documents were available for the 
same fiscal year.  For the school-years panel, 80 percent of the observations use IRS 
990 forms as a data source, and 20 percent come from independently audited 
financial statements.  Audited financial statements are the basis for reporting on IRS 
990 forms, however, the later provide more expense detail than a typical audited 
financial statement (e.g., occupancy, supplies, etc.).  For general classifications of 
assets and liabilities, however, these documents are identical.   
 
                                                 
6Since the Charter School Act was passed in 1998, 34 start-up charter schools have opened.  By 
the 2006-07 school year, five had closed.  Of the 29 remaining, three did not prepare financial 
statements separate from their district authorizers.  All three of these schools serve small, 
specialized populations of at-risk students.  By the end of the 2006-07 school year, two more 
schools had closed, and only one had completed an audited financial statement before closing, 
which is included in this analysis. 
7 This fact, itself, is a poor indicator of financial health.  Exceptions to this include one school 
being on a calendar fiscal year and another awaiting its audit from the Office of the State Auditor. 
8 IRS 990s are informational returns that nonprofits are required to file with the IRS. 
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V.  Findings 
In the course of collecting audited financial statements for this report, the 
accounting guidelines adopted by each school, their formats, and when the statements 
were reported provided insight into the ambiguity of financial reporting requirements 
for start-up charter schools and variation in how charter schools are interpreting them.  
Table 2 reports whether the school used the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) or the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) guidelines, the 
accounting firm that audited their financial statements, and the date of the auditor’s 
opinion letter.  Since 15 different accounting firms prepared the statements used in 
the analysis, it is expected that presentation of financial information will vary; 
however, it is interesting to find that 19 schools used FASB guidelines (76 percent) 
and six reported under GASB guidelines (24 percent).  Four schools used both—
FASB as primary and GASB fund level reporting as supplemental information (not 
shown). 
FASB guidelines apply to private, for-profit and not-for-profit organizations 
and require accrual accounting methods that recognize revenues when earned and 
expenses when financial assets are used to provide goods and services.  Most charter 
schools have adopted Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 117, 
Financial Statements of Not-for-Profit Organizations, as guidance for reporting their 
financial activities and position.  Among directions to classify expenses as program 
services or support activities, SFAS 117 also requires classification of net assets as 
permanently restricted, temporarily restricted, or unrestricted.  Of the 19 schools 
using FASB to report, two did not report expenses within function (program services 
vs. support activities);9 four more did not present financial information from the prior 
year alongside fiscal year 2007.  Prior year reporting is not required by SFAS 117 but 
is standard practice in auditing because it aids detection of changes in financial 
activities from year to year.  As for classification of net assets, Georgia’s start-up 
charter schools infrequently report having permanently restricted or temporarily 
restricted net assets.  Only six schools report having any temporarily restricted assets, 
typically from designated donations or specific uses of grant money. 
                                                 
9 These two financial statements were prepared by the same auditor. 
TABLE 2. INFORMATION ABOUT ACCOUNTING FIRM AND GUIDELINES USED FOR 2006-07 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR GEORGIA’S START-
UP CHARTER SCHOOLS 
Charter School 2006-07 Auditor FASB GASB Date of Auditor's Report 
Kennesaw Charter School Berman, Hopkins, Wright & Laham   X September 11, 2007 
International Community School Brooks, McGinnis &  Co., LLC X   September 20, 2007 
Oglethorpe Charter School Canady, Richbourg & Co., LLP X   November 13, 2007 
Lewis Academy of Excellence Carter Davis Group X   November 10, 2007 
Kids Peace School of Georgia Concannon, Miller & Co., P.C. X   April 18, 2007 
Charter Conservatory For Liberal Arts and Technology Denmark & Brown, PC X   September 4, 2007 
Baconton Community Charter School Erwin & Johnson CPAs   X May 5, 2008 
Odyssey Charter School Erwin & Johnson CPAs X   December 7, 2007 
DeKalb Academy of Technology and the Environment Erwin & Johnson CPAs X   March 17, 2008 
University Community Academy Gifford, Hillegass & Ingwersen X   September 17, 2007 
Drew Charter School Gifford, Hillegass & Ingwersen X   September 27, 2007 
Neighborhood Charter School Gifford, Hillegass & Ingwersen X   September 25, 2007 
Tech High School Gifford, Hillegass & Ingwersen X   September 6, 2007 
Atlanta Charter Middle School Gifford, Hillegass & Ingwersen X   September 25, 2007 
SIA Tech James Moore & Co.   X October 8, 2007 
Brighten Academy Mauldin & Jenkins   X April 28, 2008 
DeKalb PATH Academy McKelvey & Russell LLC X   September 8, 2007 
KIPP West Atlanta Young Scholars Academy McKelvey & Russell LLC X   September 26, 2007 
Academy of Lithonia Plante Moran   X October 3, 2007 
Amana Academy Robins, Eskew, Farmer & Jordon X   September 18, 2007 
Fulton Science Academy Samuel J. Durden, CPA X   September 18, 2007 
KIPP South Fulton Samuel J. Durden, CPA X   September 26, 2007 
Hapeville Middle School Samuel J. Durden, CPA X   September 10, 2007 
T.E.A.C.H. School Samuel J. Durden, CPA X   September 28, 2007 
Marietta Charter School Waddell, Smith, Magoon   X September 19, 2007 
Total Number of Schools 25 19 6 Late = 8 
Note: Kids Peace School of Georgia submitted financial statements for the 2006 calendar year. 
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GASB guidelines apply to public organizations or governmental entities that 
operate to serve a government.  GASB presentation of financial information uses 
accrual accounting for government-wide statements, but uses a modified accrual 
system for fund level reporting.  GASB primarily differs from FASB in its focus on 
the availability and use of current resources to provide public services.  It is a more 
conservative reporting of resources available to fund specific services, recognizing 
revenues only when measurable and available (rather than earned) and expenses 
when legally liable for them (rather than when used).  At the fund level, a charter 
school’s financial position generally will look worse off under GASB than the same 
financial position reported under FASB.  This is due to requirements of modified 
accrual accounting which do not recognize acquisitions of property and equipment as 
long-term assets.  For example, a school that purchases computers in a school year 
will report the acquisition as an expense, but not be able to claim them as assets when 
reporting its fund balance for a fiscal year.  GASB remedies this conservative 
approach by requiring organizations also to prepare government-wide statements of 
financial position and activities based on accrual methods similar to FASB.  Charter 
schools using GASB, however, only report fund level information for having their 
financials included as a component unit of their authorizing district. 
Neither charter school law nor guidance from the State Department of 
Education specifies whether charter schools should use FASB or GASB for financial 
reporting.  Some district authorizers require GASB presentation so that the financial 
information will conform to their financial reporting requirements, which involve 
incorporating charter schools as component units into their Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports.  Atlanta Public Schools (APS), for example, recently began 
requiring GASB presentation for this reason.  Many of APS’ charter schools, 
however, have chosen to use both presentations because FASB guidelines are 
preferred by foundations and private organizations that provide operating grants to 
charter schools.  Since start-up schools are legally not-for-profit organizations, they 
must report using accrual methods to the Internal Revenue Service each year for form 
990.  It also may be more practical and useful for charter schools to use FASB 
guidelines, under which they are allowed to present property and equipment as assets 
 
An Examination of the Financial Health of 
Georgia's Start-Up Charter Schools 
 
 
16 
and report expenses, such as inventory, when they are used rather than when they are 
acquired (based on accrual accounting).  Regardless of which presentation is most 
relevant to the needs of charter schools, it is a challenge to compute financial 
indicators that are comparable across schools that use different guidelines.  In most 
cases it is possible to reconstruct similar measures to conform to a FASB 
presentation, but caution should be taken when evaluating indicators using current 
and net assets later in this report. 
In collecting financial statements from GDOE, it also was interesting to learn 
the non-compliance rate for submitting these documents to the State.  As Table 2 
reports, eight of the 25 schools (32 percent) did not complete their financial audits by 
the October 1 deadline as specified in the Georgia Charter Schools Act of 1998.10 
Untimely audits may be an indicator that the school has poor accounting practices 
and cannot readily compile its financial information to meet the deadline, or 
management is distracted from or unaware of compliance deadlines.  Conversations 
with auditors compiling financial statements for start-up charter schools suggest that 
the time of year when audits are due contributes to untimely reporting.  The fiscal 
year for all but one school ends on June 30th, when school staff is on summer break 
and when management is consumed with other tasks related to the start of a new 
school year during the months of August and September just prior to the deadline.  In 
addition, some charter school operators claim that they use the same auditor as their 
authorizer, and the auditor compiles the charter school’s statement after the district 
audit is complete.   
Regardless of why audits are not prepared by October 1, it is a reasonable 
expectation that schools should have their financial statements complete at least by 
November 15th when IRS 990 forms are due, nearly five months after the close of the 
fiscal year.  Using this criterion, four schools would still have “late” audits.  Schools 
that are regularly reporting activity statements to their boards should have few 
problems complying with reporting deadlines (Young and Anthony, 2008).  In fact, 
                                                 
10 The Charter Schools Act of 1998 requires start-up charter schools to submit annual reports to 
their authorizers and the Charter School Division of the State Department of Education by October 
1.  The law permits charter schools to submit either audited or unaudited financial statements at 
that time, with the expectation that audited financial statements will be forwarded to both entities 
when they are complete. 
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most charter petitions require language that attests that their board will review 
financial statements monthly or quarterly.  Untimely submission of financial 
statements may reveal that schools are not complying with good governance 
practices, in addition to audit reporting.  Poor governance in a school is likely to lead 
to financial difficulties over time, especially when charter schools rely on the 
financial expertise of their board members to navigate the shallow operating margins 
most schools face early in operation. 
Untimely submission of audited financial statements also prevents GDOE and 
the State Board of Education from effectively monitoring the financial health of 
charter schools on an annual basis.  Each year, the Charter Schools Division (CSD) of 
GDOE submits an Annual Report to the State Board of Education reporting on the 
characteristics and performance of charter schools in Georgia.  Each charter school’s 
self-submitted report is printed in the appendix, which includes answers to two 
questions for financial accountability: “1) Did [the] school have [a] surplus at the end 
of the 2006-07 school year?” and 2) Did [the] school have a reserve fund? If so, what 
percentage?” Of the schools that did not have their audited financial statements 
complete by the due date of the annual reports (eight schools), six incorrectly 
answered these questions when compared to their financial statements audited after 
October 1.  Four schools incorrectly identified having a surplus, claiming “No” they 
did not have a surplus when their audited financial statements show positive 
operating balances.  Two schools reported no reserve fund, but had positive net 
assets; and one school claimed to have a surplus when its audited financials indicate 
it did not.11 Interestingly, most schools reported a poorer financial position than their 
audited financial statements reveal.  It is not known how much information these 
schools had about their actual financial position when they answered these questions 
or whether some schools were acting strategically in their financial reporting.  
Regardless of intent, incorrect reporting prevents GDOE and the State Board of 
Education from assessing the financial health of charter schools. 
                                                 
11 One school misidentified its surplus and reserve fund.  The schools that reported “no” to a 
reserve fund have liquidity ratios over 1.0, indicating they have excess cash on hand.  It is possible 
that schools interpret “reserve fund” as a special account set aside for lean operating years.  It is 
not clear how GDOE expects schools to interpret this question. 
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Finally, financial statements also provide information on deficiencies in 
internal controls over financial reporting.  Internal control deficiencies exist when a 
financial system a school has in place to manage its financial recording or reporting 
does not allow the school’s management to prevent or detect misstatements in a 
timely manner.  In fiscal year 2007, four schools had internal control deficiencies 
reported in their audited financial statements.12 Two schools were not providing their 
Boards with periodic financial statements or recording minutes from Board meetings 
when financial decisions are made.  Other deficiencies among these schools included 
inability to document purchasing card transactions, improper recognition of expenses 
under GASB, lack of segregation of duties in handling money and managing financial 
transactions, and overpayment of fees to an educational management company. 
 
Financial Indicators 
 The financial health of Georgia’s start-up schools in the 2006-07 school year 
is mixed.  Although 11 schools (44 percent) ran an operating deficit or had negative 
net assets, just one school closed at the end of the fiscal year.13 (See Appendix for a 
complete list of indicators by school.) Of the 11 with operating deficits or negative 
net assets, two appear to be financially sound in the short-term on other key 
indicators, such as current assets greater than 60 percent of total assets and the 
current/quick ratios over 2.0.  The remaining nine schools in deficit all have 
current/quick ratios at or under 1.0, indicating that they are not likely to meet their 
current obligations given their current assets.  These nine schools share notable 
characteristics—enrolling fewer than 250 students or being in the 4th or 5th years of 
operation.14  
 An aim of this analysis is to see if performance on financial indicators varies 
by school characteristics.  Table 3 reports median per pupil spending and medians for 
measures of liquidity and fund balance by school type, age, and size. The first column  
                                                 
12 Only one of these four schools also completed its audit “late” after October 1. 
13 This school’s charter was not renewed by the local authorizing district.  Reasons for non-
renewal included failure to meet AYP, significant management turnover, and enrollment errors 
that led to inaccurate funding. 
14 One school does not share either of these characteristics.  In the 2006-07 school year, it had 328 
students and was in its first year of operation under a re-instated charter. 
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TABLE 3. LIQUIDITY AND FUND BALANCE INDICATORS BY SCHOOL TYPE, AGE, AND SIZE FOR 
GEORGIA’S START-UP CHARTER SCHOOLS (2006-07 SCHOOL YEAR) 
-----------------------------------Median-------------------------------- 
-------------Liquidity----------- ---------Fund Balance--------- 
Characteristic N 
Median 
Per Pupil 
Spendinga 
Current 
Assets  
(% Total 
Assets) 
Current
Ratio 
Quick 
Ratio 
Net 
Assets 
(% Exp.) 
Surplus/Deficit 
(% Exp.) 
School Typeb 
Elementary 7 7,455 54.0% 1.7 1.6 8.1% 0.1% 
K-8 6 8,688 59.6% 2.2 2.1 12.3% 2.4% 
Middle 7 9,442 68.7% 9.7 9.6 33.4% 5.5% 
High School 5 12,206 36.2% 1.1 0.5 21.3% -3.6% 
School Age 
1-3 years 12 8,210 49.4% 1.5 1.0 20.6% 1.1% 
4-5 years 9 9,906 58.8% 2.1 2.1 20.2% 0.1% 
6 or over 4 7,988 68.0% 14.1 13.0 17.4% 3.0% 
School Size 
1~250 10 10,590 44.4% 1.1 0.8 18.0% -4.2% 
251~350 9 9,442 54.5% 2.2 2.2 17.4% 5.5% 
over 350 6 7,101 68.7% 11.4 11.0 21.9% 2.4% 
All Schools 25 9,067 54.5% 2.2 1.9 17.4% 2.3% 
aPer Pupil spending includes instructional and non-instructional expenses (e.g., administration, 
facilities). 
bOne of the schools classified as high schools serves 6-12 grades. 
Source: Georgia Start-Up Charter Schools, 2006-07 Audited Financial Statements. 
 
 
reports per pupil spending by each characteristic to compare charter school 
expenditures with what is known in the education finance literature about spending 
variation among traditional public schools.  Median per pupil spending among all 
Georgia start-up charter schools, which includes instructional and non-instructional 
expenses such as facilities, is about $9,000.  This amount varies as expected by 
school type and size.  Elementary schools spend the least amount per pupil ($7,500) 
compared  to  K-8  programs  ($8,700),  middle  schools  ($9,400),  and  high  schools  
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($12,200).15  Likewise, per pupil expenditures varies with school size.  Schools with 
approximately 250 students or less spent $10,600 per pupil on average compared to 
$9,400 per pupil for schools with 250 to 350 students and $7,100 for schools with 
more than 350 students.  Charter schools have to carry out many of the same 
administrative functions as traditional public schools, including most school business 
functions.  Small schools have fewer students over which to spread these costs.  
Studies examining the cost structure of public schools have found significant 
economies of size, especially for administrative costs (Andrews, Duncombe, and 
Yinger, 2002).  Moody’s (2003) has found that “the smallest schools having 
investment grade characteristics have a minimum enrollment of between 300 and 500 
students…” (p.4). 
Measures of liquidity and fund balance for financial condition also appear to 
vary by size, but less so by school type or age.  Table 3 reports the median values of 
these financial indicators.  Measures of cash and other liquid assets on hand at the end 
of the year to meet current liabilities are stronger for larger schools.  Current assets as 
a percentage of total assets have a median of 54.5 percent for all charter schools, but 
vary from 44.4 percent for the smallest schools to 68.7 percent for the largest ones.  
Current and quick ratios follow a similar pattern, with the smallest schools averaging 
$1 in current assets for every $1 in current liabilities compared to a much higher ratio 
of $11.4 in current assets for every $1 in current liabilities for schools with 
enrollments over 350 students.  A current ratio of 2.0 or higher is a rough rule of 
thumb for adequate liquid resources on hand to meet current obligations.  Of the ten 
schools with fewer than 250 students, seven have ratios below this guideline.  This 
trend is also reflected in the schools’ measure of operating reserves, although it is not 
as consistent as the liquidity ratios.  Small schools have a median operating deficit of 
-4.2 percent of total expenditures compared to positive operating balances of 5.5 
percent for schools with enrollments between 250-300 students and 2.4 percent for 
schools with over 350 students.  Net assets as a percentage of total expenditures 
                                                 
15 Typically, high school students are more expensive to educate because their courses require 
more equipment (e.g., science laboratories) than elementary or middle school students.  In 
Georgia, however, the school funding formula weights high school students less than lower 
grades; thus, the increase in per pupil spending for high school students in Table 3 is likely a result 
of larger class sizes. 
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indicates that larger schools have accumulated slightly more reserves (21.9 percent) 
compared to small (18.0 percent) and medium-sized charter schools (17.4 percent).  
Since larger schools are often older schools due to the practice of adding grades, 
larger reserves may also be the result of having more time to accumulate assets. 
It is expected that school age might be associated with measures of financial 
condition among start-up charter schools, since young organization have not had an 
opportunity to accumulate reserves.  Measures of liquidity and net assets show clear 
patterns of improved financial health as schools age.  Schools in operation for three 
years or less have lower and below recommended current and quick ratios (1.5 and 
1.0) compared to schools open for four to five years (2.2 and 2.2) and six or more 
years (14.1 and 13.0).  This indicates that schools, at the median, are accumulating 
cash or reducing their current liabilities the longer they are open.  Older schools also 
have more liquid assets on hand than younger schools, with current assets over 60 
percent of all assets compared to 50 percent for schools aged one to three years.  This 
is likely the result of younger schools having less cash in reserves due to large start-
up investments in furniture and equipment, as well as some schools closing within the 
first charter period (five years).   
Year-to-year operating balances, however, do not follow this pattern.  Schools 
in early years of operation have higher percentages of surpluses as a percent of total 
expenditures (1.1 percent) compared to schools in years four or five of operation (0.1 
percent).  This is likely the result of new schools having access to implementation 
grants from the federal government and private foundations during the first years of 
operation.16  Schools open in their sixth year or later have the highest median 
operating balance from the 2006-07 school year (3.0 percent).  Although positive 
operating balances in later years is a good sign of financial health, surpluses are still 
marginal.  Low operating surpluses for older schools may also reflect that start-up 
schools surviving past their first charter renewal (post year 5) use resources more 
efficiently, leaving less available as surplus at the end of the year while still ensuring 
                                                 
16 Federal implementation grants for start-up schools provide $400,000 over a 24-month period 
after charter approval from the State Board of Education.  The Walton Family Foundation also has 
a competitive process for $220,000 of post-authorization grants for aiding the development of 
quality charter schools in Georgia. 
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they can meet current obligations (as evidenced in their liquidity ratios).  Small 
operating balances at the end of the year, however, underscore how vulnerable start-
ups may be if enrollment suddenly declines or if state or local revenue decreases 
significantly. 
A final objective of this analysis was to begin to understand the revenue 
streams and fixed cost burdens faced by start-up charter schools.  Table 4 reports 
medians of the percentage of total revenues accounted for by federal, state, and local 
funding and the percentages of management and facilities expenses of total 
expenditures by school characteristics.  For government aid, interesting patterns 
emerge for school age and size.  At the median, start-up charter schools derive 94.0 
percent of their operating income from federal, state, and local sources.  Other major 
sources of income include individual contributions from fundraising and program 
income from before/after school care and food services.  Schools in their early years 
of operation receive 89.6 percent of their revenues from government aid versus 99.5 
percent for schools open six years or longer.  These shares reflect grants from private 
foundations that are available in Georgia (e.g., the Walton Family Foundation) that 
are meant to help new schools grow and stabilize.  This private start-up assistance 
from foundations also drives variation in the percentage of government aid by school 
size.  Small schools report 91.3 percent of their revenues from federal, state, or local 
sources compared to 96.8 percent for schools with more than 350 students.  Schools 
with fewer students in the 2006-07 school year are likely in the process of growing 
their enrollments as they add grades over the term of their charters.  Private 
foundations interested in expanding the number of charter schools in Georgia provide 
substantial aid to help schools through these “ramp-up” periods ($220,000 in the case 
of the Walton Family Foundation).  Since six of the twelve schools in their first three 
years of operation ran operating deficits in the 2006-07 school year, this funding 
appears to be essential to being able to keep their doors open.  Indeed, schools in 
years four and five  of  operation  show very  little operating  surplus  (0.1  percent  of  
 
 
 
 
 
An Examination of the Financial Health of 
Georgia's Start-Up Charter Schools 
 
 
 23
TABLE 4. SHARES OF PUBLIC REVENUE AND STEP/FIXED COSTS BY SCHOOL 
CHARACTERISTIC FOR GEORGIA START-UP CHARTER SCHOOLS (2006-07 SCHOOL 
YEAR) 
--------------------------------Median----------------------------- 
Category N 
-----Flexibility----- --------------Step/Fixed Costs------------ 
Govt. Aid 
(% Total Rev.) 
Management Exp. 
(% Total Exp.) 
Facilities Rent  
(% Total Exp.) 
School Type 
Elementary 7 89.9% 13.5% 9.2% 
K-8 6 99.6% 11.7% 14.1% 
Middle 7 94.0% 7.6% 7.9% 
High School 5 86.0% 14.6% 9.9% 
School Age 
1-3 years 12 89.6% 12.1% 13.4% 
4-5 years 9 91.4% 8.5% 7.9% 
6 or over 4 99.5% 16.3% 7.4% 
School Size 
1~250 10 91.3% 13.4% 13.1% 
250~350 9 90.2% 10.8% 8.0% 
over 350 6 96.8% 13.2% 8.1% 
All Schools 25 94.0% 12.5% 9.2% 
Note: One of the schools classified as high schools serves 6-12 grades. 
Source: Georgia Start-Up Charter Schools, 2006-07 Audited Financial Statements  
 
 
expenditures) without access to these private funds that typically are used up after the 
first three years of operating.17 
Moody’s (2003) suggests that one of the biggest risks to the financial health 
of charter schools are the fixed costs of facilities and administration.  It reports, 
“Moody’s does not believe that narrow financial margins reflect weak financial 
management or controls, but are inherent, instead, to the significant start-up costs 
faced by charter schools.” (p.10).  In an effort to understand the extent of these costs 
for Georgia’s start-up charter schools, shares of total expenditures were calculated for 
management/general expenses and facilities.  At the median, management and 
general administrative expenses accounted for 12.5 percent of total expenditures 
                                                 
17 New charter schools also have access to federal implementation grants ($400,000 over a 24-
month period) that contribute to small operating surpluses of many schools in their first three years 
of operation. 
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followed by 9.2 percent for facilities.18 If aggregated, these two expenditure 
categories account for over 20 percent of all spending.  Schools contracting with 
educational management organizations (EMO) (n = 6) report spending 24 percent on 
management and general expenses alone, with fees accounting for 14 percent of total 
expenditures (not shown).  Further investigation into EMO services may be 
warranted given these shares of expenditures.19 Spending for management and 
general administration varies by school size, but not school type or age.  Generally, a 
fixed-type cost is expected to decline as enrollment increases; but for Georgia’s 
charter schools this trend appears to move in the opposite direction for management 
expenses.  This trend indicates that management expenses are step costs, where 
having more students does not require additional personnel until a particular 
threshold (or “step”) is reached.  Small schools (up to 250 students) report that 13.4 
percent of expenditures go towards management and administration compared to 10.8 
percent for schools with 250 to 350 students.  Management shares then increase in 
schools with more than 350 students (13.2 percent).  It is likely the case that larger 
schools require one or two more administrators, thus the slight rebound in value of 
shares.  Indeed, supervisory salaries are a classic example of step-cost functions in 
most organizations (Young and Anthony, 2008). 
Shares of expenditures for facilities follow the expected decline for fixed 
costs as school size increases.  Small schools report spending 13.1 percent on 
facilities compared to 8.1 percent for the largest schools.  The pattern in school type 
suggests that schools with the most grades (K-8) spend a higher share on facilities 
(14.1 percent) than fewer grades (just 7.9 percent for middle schools).  This reflects 
the need for more individual classrooms for separate grades.  Overall, there is 
substantial variation in the facilities costs charter schools have incurred.  See 
Appendix.) Some schools have few facilities expenses because their authorizing 
districts give them space; the top 10 percent pay over 19 percent of total expenses for 
                                                 
18 For most schools it was possible to disaggregate facilities expenses or payment on long-term 
debt used to acquire facilities from management and general expenditures.  In a few cases, 
however, objects of expenditures were not detailed enough to separate them.  Caution should be 
taken in aggregating the percentages for management and facilities to imply a total share for 
overhead. 
19 Some EMOs provide more than traditional business services, including student recruitment and 
licensed curriculum. 
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their facilities.  These shares omit leasehold improvements that schools often must 
make to meet occupancy codes for public schools.  In most cases, schools with the 
lowest facilities costs have agreements with their local authorizers to rent existing 
school space, as opposed to schools with higher shares for facilities which rent 
commercial space or effectively rent facilities from their EMOs.  Legislation passed 
in May 2009 requires school districts with excess facilities to make them available to 
charter schools free of charge.  For charter schools currently leasing facilities from 
their districts, this legislation will free up substantial resources (up to 10 percent of 
current operating expenditures) for other needs. 
 
School-Year Panel 
 To investigate if the relationships between financial indicators and school 
characteristics hold when we consider more years of observations, an unbalanced 
panel was compiled pooling data from financial statements for all years a school has 
been in operation.  For the 25 schools in operation in 2006-07, age ranges from one to 
eight years.  This results in 92 school-year observations.20 Table 5 presents liquidity 
and fund balance measures for the 92 school-year observations for comparison to 
Table 3 from just one year of data.  Nearly all of the patterns are consistent with the 
cross-section from the 2006-07 school year, with the notable exception of school size.  
School type continues to have no clear pattern, while school age seems to be 
associated with improved financial health.  For example, schools in their first three 
years of operation report a median current ratio of 3.2, compared to 3.9 for schools 
four to five years old and 14.0 for schools operating for six years or more.  Net assets 
as a percent of expenditures are also slightly lower for young school (19.3 percent) 
compared to schools six years or older (20.3 percent).  Patterns in operating surpluses 
are similar to the cross-section, suggesting that young schools have larger surpluses 
(7.3 percent) compared to those in years four and five (0.8 percent), which no longer 
have access to implementation funds.   
 
                                                 
20 Four school-year observations do not have a complete set of financial indicators or school 
characteristics data and are excluded from the panel. 
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TABLE 5. LIQUIDITY AND FUND BALANCE INDICATORS BY SCHOOL TYPE, AGE, AND SIZE FOR 
GEORGIA’S START-UP CHARTER SCHOOLS (SCHOOL-YEAR PANEL) 
----------------------------------Median---------------------------------
Characteristic N 
Median 
Per Pupil 
Spendinga
---------------Liquidity--------------- ---------Fund Balance-------
Current Assets 
(% Total Assets)
Current
Ratio 
Quick
Ratio
Net Assets 
(% Exp.) 
Surplus/Deficit
(% Exp.) 
School Typeb 
Elementary 22 9,171 56.4% 1.7 1.7 16.4% 3.3% 
K-8 26 7,761 61.7% 1.2 1.2 9.4% 3.0% 
Middle 32 8,344 70.8% 11.8 11.8 32.3% 9.5% 
High School 12 10,403 57.8% 2.4 1.3 25.8% -1.4% 
School Age 
1-3 years 60 8,251 64.9% 3.2 2.3 19.3% 7.3% 
4-5 years 23 8,559 60.5% 3.9 3.8 19.5% 0.8% 
6 or over 9 6,746 68.6% 14.0 14.0 20.3% 5.5% 
School Size 
1~250 45 9,288 66.1% 3.9 3.0 21.8% 7.0% 
251~350 24 6,997 65.3% 3.1 3.1 19.3% 4.8% 
over 350 23 7,384 60.5% 3.2 3.2 10.9% 2.3% 
All Schools 92 8,251 65.4% 3.5 3.1 19.5% 4.4% 
Note: aPer Pupil spending includes instructional and non-instructional expenses (e.g., administration, 
facilities).  
bOne of the schools classified as high schools serves 6-12 grades. 
Source: Georgia Start-Up Charter Schools, Audited Financial Statements, Various Years 
 
 
 Financial indicators by school size exhibit interesting patterns that deviate 
from the cross-section, but may be explained by the pooled nature of these data.  For 
example, per pupil expenditures decrease as enrollment increases in a similar pattern 
to the one year cross-section; however, measures of liquidity and fund balance also 
decrease.  Although differences in current and quick ratios are small (3.9 for small 
schools versus 3.2 for large schools), variation in measures of fund balance are 
surprisingly large.  For example, schools with 250 students or less report median net 
assets as a percentage of expenditures of 21.8 percent compared to 10.9 percent for 
schools with over 350 students.  Likewise, surpluses of small schools are a larger 
share of expenditures (7.0 percent) compared to larger schools (2.3 percent).  These 
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measures suggest that financial position is stronger for small schools—an unexpected 
outcome if small schools are burdened with substantial fixed costs.   
It is important to keep in mind, however, that these relationships are 
simple, bivariate comparisons and do not account for school age.  Further 
examination of the relationship between school size and fund balance reveals a 
great deal of variation in operating surplus/deficits among schools with 250 
students or less and in their first three years of operation.  This variation decreases 
substantially as enrollment increases and as schools age (Figure 1).  Thus, it 
appears that the unexpected patterns for liquidity and fund balance in these pooled 
data are largely driven by the volatility in these measures in a school’s early years 
of operation.  In other words, school age may be more important than school size 
for liquidity and fund balance measures of financial health.21 
 The measures of financial health that assess fixed costs for charter schools 
follow patterns expected for school size in the pooled data.  Table 6 presents the 
median values of management and facilities costs as a percent of expenditures for 
comparison to Table 4.  Management expenses are larger for charter schools with 
enrollments over 350 (19.2 percent) compared to the smallest school (10.5 percent).  
This follows the pattern for management and general expenses in the cross-section 
from 2006-07 and indicates that larger schools require more administrative personnel.  
For facilities, Table 6 reports that the pooled data are consistent with the cross-
section, in that the share of total expenses accounted for by facilities generally 
decreases as enrollment increases.  Small schools report spending 9.9 percent of total 
expenditures on facilities compared to 8.2 percent for schools with more than 350 
students.  Facilities are a classic example of fixed costs, where more students 
generate higher revenues to cover an expense that does not change until enrollment 
exceeds the facility’s capacity.  Finally, reliance on government revenues in the 
school-year panel matches trends in the cross-section from 2006-07.  At the median, 
Georgia’s start-ups get 95.9 percent of their revenues from federal, state, and local 
                                                 
21 We expect some of the variation in financial indicators to decrease as schools close due to fiscal 
stress. 
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government sources, with older being more heavily reliant on government revenues 
due to private implementation grants ending after the first three years of operation. 
 
FIGURE 1. SCATTERPLOT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENROLLMENT AND 
OPERATING SURPLUS/DEFICITS AS A PERCENT OF EXPENDITURES FOR GEORGIA’S 
START-UP CHARTER SCHOOLS (SCHOOL-YEAR PANEL) 
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TABLE 6. SHARES OF PUBLIC REVENUE AND FIXED COSTS BY SCHOOL 
CHARACTERISTIC FOR GEORGIA START-UP CHARTER SCHOOLS (SCHOOL-YEAR 
PANEL) 
----------------------------Median--------------------------- 
Category N 
----Flexibility--- -----------Step/Fixed Costs---------- 
Govt. Aid 
(% Total Rev.) 
Management 
(% Total Exp.) 
Facilities 
(% Total Exp.) 
School Type 
Elementary 22 91.1% 9.6% 9.4% 
K-8 26 99.1% 14.2% 8.4% 
Middle 32 95.4% 9.3% 7.6% 
High School 12 96.3% 17.6% 11.6% 
School Age 
1-3 years 60 94.8% 10.8% 9.9% 
4-5 years 23 96.3% 11.0% 7.4% 
6 or over 9 99.3% 18.8% 7.3% 
School Size 
1~250 45 91.1% 10.5% 9.9% 
250~350 24 96.2% 10.9% 8.1% 
over 350 23 99.0% 19.2% 8.2% 
All Schools 92 95.9% 11.5% 9.0% 
Note: One of the schools classified as high schools serves 6-12 grades. 
Source: Georgia Start-Up Charter Schools, Audited Financial Statements, Various 
Years. 
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VI.  Discussion 
Because charter schools face a number of fiscal challenges, it is important to 
regularly monitor their financial condition.  Regular financial health assessments can 
be valuable to charter school administrators and board members in their budget 
deliberations, to chartering agencies in providing support to charter schools and in 
considering charter renewal, and to the State Department of Education in its 
monitoring role as well as for considering charter policy changes.  This report 
provides several preliminary lessons for Georgia’s start-up charter schools and their 
authorizers as they monitor financial health. 
● The financial health of Georgia’s start-up charter schools in the 2006-07 
school year is mixed.  Although a majority of start-up schools had a positive 
financial position, over 40 percent of schools (11 out of 25) ran an operating 
deficit or reported negative net assets at the end of their fiscal years.  One of 
these schools closed at the end of the school year.  Although eight of the 
schools running operating deficits had positive net assets to sustain them to 
the next school year, only two had large enough reserves of cash to meet 
current liabilities at recommended levels (current ratio of 2.0 or higher).  
Three schools had negative net assets, all of which were in their first two 
years of operating.  It is not unusual for new start-up schools to be in debt as 
they grow and age, but these schools are struggling to meet expenditure 
commitments even with access to implementation grants.  Two of these 
schools are in debt to their EMO for start-up loans and burdensome facilities 
costs. 
● School age is a key factor in financial condition.  Having enough cash on 
hand to meet current obligations is difficult for schools operating in their first 
three years, as evidenced by their low liquidity ratios relative to schools 
making it past the first charter re-authorization period (year 6 and beyond).  
New start-ups rely on private foundation and federal grants to survive through 
the early years of operation as they grow their enrollments.  Although public 
and private implementation grants keep many young schools in the black, 
they also contribute to a great deal of variability in measures of fund balance 
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for these schools.  Schools that survive to year four and beyond may have 
lower operating surpluses as a share of expenditures, but they often manage to 
accumulate a consistent (and arguably more predictable) fund balance 
regardless of enrollment level.  This may indicate that as charter school board 
members and managers become more experienced, they are able to develop 
budgeting and financial management practices more appropriate to their 
schools’ operating environments. 
● School size is positively related to charter school financial health, but it is 
unclear if larger enrollments by themselves help improve a school’s financial 
position or if larger enrollments only improve financial health for more 
established charter schools.  School age is correlated with school size for 
Georgia’s start-up charters (0.46).  As “experiments” in public education for 
curriculum and governance, it has been considered good practice to slowly 
grow enrollment over the first several years of operation so that curriculum 
methodology and management structure can develop.  For short-term 
financial condition, however, low enrollments can put schools at risk of 
closure because they have less per-pupil revenue to spread over their 
step/fixed costs.  It is difficult to discern if low liquidity and fund balance 
measures for small schools is a function of size or age or the combination of 
both.  Clearly for some costs like facilities, the number of students in a school 
is important.  Local authorizers and the State might consider increasing 
funding beyond federal implementation grants to aid charter schools’ start-up 
through the first charter renewal term if enrollments are expected to be small.  
Another option might be to encourage charters to start with more students or 
ramp up their enrollments more quickly to improve financial stability.  More 
research is needed on the interrelationship between school size and age in 
charter school financial health. 
● As small, independent organizations, charter schools have few opportunities 
to realize economies of size.  Start-up charter schools are free from the 
governance of their local districts and the State, leaving each school 
responsible for managing and staffing non-instructional services on its own.  
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These services range from marketing to payroll to food services.  About $1 of 
every $8 in expenditures for a charter school goes towards management and 
administration costs alone (food services and facilities excluded).  
Management and administration expenses typically include salaries of school 
business staff who manage a school’s books, manage student and teacher 
records (vital for ensuring correct funding from the state), recruit students and 
teachers, manage information technology services, etc.  Charter schools that 
do not provide these services themselves must contract out for them or find 
qualified volunteers to do the work.  Traditional public schools have a central 
administrative office to provide these services for many schools.  An 
alternative to providing additional state funding to charter schools to pay for 
these services on their own is to help them reduce costs through shared 
services.  For example, it may be beneficial to charter schools to buy business 
services from their authorizing districts as an alternative to using private 
contractors or an educational management organization.  Since local 
authorizers already have the systems in place to provide these services, it is 
likely to be a relatively low additional cost to the district to add charter 
schools.  Other services such as transportation and food service are offered to 
charters in some districts, so it seems plausible to add-on services like student 
data management, payroll, and plant maintenance.   
In cases where charter schools would prefer to maintain their 
independence or their local districts are not willing to extend services to 
charter schools, then cooperative service agreements among charter schools 
may be an option for reducing costs.  Since 75 percent of start-up charter 
schools are located within the Atlanta metropolitan region, it seems 
worthwhile to share business services and pool equipment and supplies 
purchases to reduce unit costs for each school.  The Knowledge is Power 
Program (KIPP) schools in the Atlanta metropolitan region share many of 
these functions, in addition to development services, social workers, and high 
school placement coordinators.  A similar cooperative for non-KIPP schools 
could help to reduce the inefficiencies associated with small schools 
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procuring the same goods and services independently.  Likewise, when 
schools are sharing services they are sharing knowledge about best practices.  
Although it is a challenge to coordinate cooperatives, the cost benefits could 
be substantial. 
● There is no official guidance or rule for start-up charter schools on which 
accounting guidelines or presentation to use in preparing their financial 
statements, nor a required deadline for submitting them to GDOE.  A 
majority of schools use FASB guidelines, but nearly half either report entirely 
in GASB or use both.  Accounting guidelines have implications for how 
schools account for expenses and revenues and whether their local districts 
treat them as component units.  No uniform practice of reporting financial 
information makes comparison of charter school finances challenging and 
closes the door on developing a meaningful financial indicator system to 
detect financial stress early in a school’s operation.  Likewise, lack of a 
statutory requirement for when audited financial statements are due to local 
authorizers and GDOE effectively nullifies any attempt to monitor financial 
health of charter schools.  Current law requires start-up charter schools to 
submit an annual report to GDOE by October 1, which may include audited 
or unaudited financial statements.  A third of schools did not have their 
financial audits complete by this date for the 2006-07 school year; thus, they 
answered financial questions in the annual report without having their 
financial position verified by an independent auditor.  An examination of the 
information provided by these schools in the 2006-07 Annual Report to the 
State Board of Education published by the Charter Schools Division (CSD) of 
GDOE reveals that all but two of these schools incorrectly reported their 
financial positions to the State in their annual reports.  Since this document is 
the only interim fiscal monitoring tool of charter schools outside of the 
charter renewal review, it is important that schools complete their 
independent audits in a timely fashion.  Audited financial statements for all 
start-up charter schools should be based on the same accounting guidelines 
(FASB vs. GASB), and charter schools should face the same required 
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deadline for submission to GDOE.  To enforce timely submission of audited 
financial statements under official rule or law, CSD could withhold federal 
implementation grants or state facilities funds or, at a minimum, post a list of 
schools not meeting the October 1 deadline since failure to complete audits 
on time itself is an indicator of poor financial management within a school. 
As this study expands to include more dimensions of financial condition (e.g., 
financial management practices, governance practices, etc.) these observations and 
recommendations are likely to reveal more complex relationships between school 
characteristics and financial health.  The preliminary results presented here should be 
interpreted with caution, since the presentation of information in the charter school’s 
financial statements vary by accounting guidelines used to prepare them.  These 
results are a first step towards identifying financial indicators that are appropriate for 
charter schools and assessing the financial health of Georgia’s start-up charter 
schools.  As the number of charter schools continue to increase in the state due to 
recent changes in authorization practices, it is important that public resources devoted 
to school choice are properly monitored.  Developing quality charter schools extends 
beyond good performance in the classroom—it must include sound financial health 
necessary to build a strong charter school community in Georgia. 
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APPENDIX. FINANCIAL INDICATORS FOR GEORGIA’S START-UP CHARTER SCHOOLS 2006-07 SCHOOL YEAR 
School Age Type* Enrollment 
Per Pupil 
Spending 
Current 
Ratio 
Quick 
Ratio 
Current 
Assets/ 
Total 
Assets 
Net 
Assets  
(% of 
Exp.) 
Operating 
Surplus/Deficit 
(% of Exp.) 
Management 
(% of Exp.) 
Facilities 
(% of 
Exp.) 
Govt. Aid 
(% Total 
Revenue) 
School A 1 1 265 6,919 1.8 1.8 17.3% 8.1% 18.2% 10.8% 13.8% 90.2% 
School B 1 2 328 7,074 0.3 0.3 54.5% -11.3% 10.4% 55.4% 19.6% 99.9% 
School C 1 1 180 12,113 1.0 1.0 54.0% -1.9% -1.9% 20.3% 34.0% 86.3% 
School D 1 4 187 8,112 0.2 0.2 10.0% 21.3% 15.5% 6.5% 9.9% 86.0% 
School E 2 3 77 13,034 5.1 5.1 44.7% 59.3% 33.5% 6.7% 16.3% 57.2% 
School F 2 2 218 8,308 0.6 0.4 44.0% 6.0% -4.8% 7.8% 13.5% 99.4% 
School G 2 1 287 6,246 2.2 2.2 95.2% 0.7% 4.0% 28.3% 8.9% 89.0% 
School H 3 2 252 9,067 2.2 1.9 64.8% 12.9% -7.0% 10.8% 19.3% 99.0% 
School I 3 3 448 6,731 9.7 9.6 68.7% 77.1% 22.2% 6.2% 8.7% 94.5% 
School J 3 4 59 19,209 2.3 0.1 100.0% 27.7% -33.3% 13.3% 13.3% 85.4% 
School K 3 1 152 6,291 1.1 0.6 10.6% 26.3% -20.8% 13.5% 11.8% 96.3% 
School L 3 4 206 12,206 1.1 0.9 36.2% 14.7% -3.5% 14.6% 8.5% 71.4% 
School M 4 1 554 7,455 1.2 1.1 60.5% -0.2% 0.1% 27.8% 9.2% 89.9% 
School N 4 3 286 10,953 15.7 15.4 51.5% 57.7% 12.6% 8.5% 0.6% 99.7% 
School O 4 3 287 9,906 2.1 2.1 16.3% 17.4% 5.5% 7.6% 7.9% 81.6% 
School P 5 4 124 8,600 0.5 0.5 2.5% 24.0% -3.6% 37.1% 12.9% 98.5% 
School Q 5 3 270 9,442 3.9 3.9 81.3% 23.8% 1.5% 20.8% 5.5% 84.5% 
School R 5 3 407 8,189 13.0 12.5 70.7% 23.6% -4.9% 4.1% 13.8% 94.0% 
School S 5 1 333 10,979 1.7 1.6 42.9% 14.6% -1.0% 8.3% 8.0% 86.0% 
School T 5 1 308 10,367 4.2 4.2 58.8% 29.7% 11.3% 3.4% 7.3% 91.4% 
School U 5 4 88 14,993 1.1 1.1 100.0% 1.0% -33.4% 20.7% 3.0% 100.0% 
School V 7 2 621 5,384 25.2 23.1 52.2% 20.3% 2.3% 1.8% 7.5% 99.0% 
School W 7 2 790 10,214 2.3 2.3 68.6% 11.6% 2.5% 29.6% 7.3% 99.8% 
School X 7 2 354 9,229 2.9 2.9 67.4% 17.4% 3.4% 12.5% 14.7% 99.8% 
School Y 8 3 396 6,746 25.9 25.9 73.9% 33.4% 5.5% 20.1% 3.6% 99.3% 
Mean 4 NA 299 9,511 5.1 4.8 53.9% 20.6% 1.4% 15.9% 11.1% 91.1% 
Std. Dev. 2 NA 172 3,114 7.3 7.1 27.4% 20.2% 15.0% 12.4% 6.7% 10.3% 
Median 4 NA 286 9,067 2.2 1.9 54.5% 17.4% 2.3% 12.5% 9.2% 94.0% 
Note: * School type indicators are: 1 = Elementary; 2 = K-8; 3=Middle School; and 4 = High School.  
Sources: 2006-07 Independent Audits. 
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projects. 
The FRC maintains a position of neutrality on public policy issues in order to 
safeguard the academic freedom of authors.  Thus, interpretations or conclusions in 
FRC publications should be understood to be solely those of the author. 
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